We study the problem of obtaining an expected utility representation for a potentially incomplete preference relation over lotteries by means of a set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. It is shown that, when the prize space is a compact metric space, a preference relation admits such a multi-utility representation provided that it satisfies the standard axioms of expected utility theory. Moreover, the representing set of utilities is unique in a welldefined sense. r
Introduction
The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem is one of the most fundamental results of the theory of individual decision making. It shows that a preference relation defined on a lottery space has an expected utility representation, provided that it is a complete and transitive binary relation that satisfies the standard independence and continuity axioms. Given the importance of this result, it is not surprising that there is a large number of studies that investigate its alterations which arise due to the relaxation of its various postulates. However, only few of these studies focus on the completeness assumption; it is presently not known if there is a reasonable way of modifying the expected utility theorem to include incomplete preferences within its coverage. Our objective here is to offer this sort of a modification, and to prove an expected utility theorem for incomplete preference relations defined over lotteries.
Before stating the nature of our contribution more concretely, let us note that there are several economic reasons why one would like to study incomplete preference relations. First of all, as advanced by several authors in the literature, it is not evident if completeness is a fundamental rationality tenet the way the transitivity property is. Aumann [2] , Bewley [3] and Mandler [14] , among others, defend this position strongly from both the normative and positive viewpoints, and suggest that a preference relation should in fact be considered as a potentially incomplete preorder, thereby allowing for the occasional ''indecisiveness'' of the agents. 1 Secondly, there are economic instances in which a decision maker is in fact composed of several agents each with a possibly distinct objective function. In such a situation requiring the completeness of the preferences of the decision maker may be too demanding. The same reasoning applies to social choice problems; after all, the Pareto dominance is a commonly used social welfare ordering (as in the first and second fundamental welfare theorems), while it is an incomplete preorder.
Since these issues are discussed at length in the literature, we shall not discuss the potential importance of incomplete preferences for economic modeling at large, but rather proceed to discuss how one may handle the problem of actually representing such preferences. 2 Curiously, the basic idea has already been suggested, albeit elusively, by von Neumann and Morgenstern [26, pp. 19-20] :
y We have conceded that one may doubt whether a person can always decide which of two alternatives y he prefers. If the general comparability assumption is not made, a mathematical theory y is still possible. It leads to what may be described as a many-dimensional vector concept of utility. This is a more complicated and less satisfactory set-up, but we do not propose to treat it systematically at this time.
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1 In concert with this position, it is recently shown that incomplete preferences can also be ''derived'' from choices by means of a standard revealed preference exercise, provided that Houthakker's axiom of revealed preference is suitably relaxed; see [7, 20] . Similarly, Danan [5] provides an alternative foundation for incomplete preferences in a dynamic choice setup that allows for incomplete knowledge of one's future tastes. Finally, Masatlioglu and Ok [15] shows how incompleteness of preferences may arise due to status quo bias and/or endowment effect, again within the revealed preference paradigm. 2 A closely related issue was studied by Aumann [2] and Kannai [11] . These authors were interested in finding an extension of an incomplete preference relation, defined over lotteries, that admits an expected utility representation. Unfortunately, as also noted by Majumdar and Sen [13] , this approach falls short of yielding a representation theorem, for it does not characterize the preference relations under consideration. More on this in Section 3.2.
In evaluation of this statement, Aumann [2, p. 449] notes that ''y Details were never published. What they probably had in mind was some kind of mapping from the space of lotteries to a canonical partially ordered euclidean space, y but it is not clear to me how this approach can be worked out.'' Our objective here is actually nothing other than formalizing Aumann's interpretation of the von NeumannMorgenstern suggestion.
To make things a bit more precise, let us denote by X the set of certain prizes, and consider a preference relation h which is defined as a (potentially incomplete) preorder on the set of all lotteries on X : It is obvious that one cannot represent h in the standard way by using a single von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, if h is actually incomplete. But one may do so by means of a set of utility functions defined on X : Thus the representation notion we suggest requires one to come up with a set U of real functions on X such that, for all lotteries p and q; phq if and only if E p ðuÞXE q ðuÞ for all uAU;
where E r ðuÞ stands for the expectation of u with respect to the lottery r ¼ p; q: We are, then, interested in obtaining an expected multi-utility representation for incomplete preference relations. This seems to correspond well to the intuition indicated in the von Neumann-Morgenstern and Aumann quotations given above.
A close relative of the above representation concept is actually suggested also by Shapley and Baucells [24] (see Remark 3 below), and is studied in the context of utility theory under certainty by Ok [21] . This concept clearly carries a stochastic dominance flavor, and hence brings the expected utility theory one step closer to the theory of stochastic orders. 3 More generally, this particular formulation of utility representation ties the expected utility theory to the theory of multi-objective decision making. While this link is often suggested to motivate the study of incomplete preferences, an axiomatization of the representation we suggest here will clearly make the connection a concrete one. What is more, such an axiomatization sheds light into the role of the completeness assumption in the classical expected utility theorem. For all practical purposes, our approach shows precisely how this theorem changes in the absence of the completeness axiom.
Put concretely, we focus in this paper on the case in which X is a compact metric space, and prove that the standard independence axiom and a mild strengthening of the standard continuity property suffice to yield an expected multi-utility representation in terms of continuous utility functions. In what follows, we shall also determine in what sense such a representation may be regarded as unique, show how it can be strengthened in the case of monetary lotteries, demonstrate that it can be used to complete a preference relation in the sense of [2] , and discuss the potential difficulties in extending the present approach to a more general class of prize spaces.
Expected multi-utility representation

Preliminaries
We take an arbitrary compact metric space X as the set of all certain prizes (degenerate lotteries), and let CðX Þ stand for the set of all continuous real maps on X (which is topologized by the sup-norm), respectively. The set of all Borel probability measures (lotteries) over X ; endowed with the topology of weak convergence, is denoted by PðX Þ: 4 We define a preference relation as any reflexive and transitive binary relation on PðX Þ: This should be contrasted with the standard theory in which a preference relation is almost exclusively assumed also to be complete. To stress this point, we note that the first-order stochastic dominance ordering (defined on a compact subset of R) is a preference relation in the general sense of the term adopted here, while this is not the case for much of the standard theory.
The most fundamental postulate of the expected utility theory is of course the independence axiom which is stated formally as follows.
Independence axiom. For any p; q; rAPðX Þ and any lAð0; 1Þ;
The independence axiom is coupled in the standard theory either with an (ordertheoretic) Archimedean axiom or with a form of (topological) continuity property. We will follow the latter approach in this paper. In particular, we shall concentrate on the following two continuity conditions. Weak continuity axiom. flA½0; 1: lp þ ð1 À lÞrhlq þ ð1 À lÞsg is closed in ½0; 1 for any p; q; r; sAPðX Þ: Continuity axiom. 5 For any convergent sequences ðp n Þ and ðq n Þ in PðX Þ; p n hq n for all n imply lim p n hlim q n :
While Shapley and Baucells [24] adopt the weak continuity axiom, we will work here with the (stronger) continuity axiom. In fact, it is an open problem to determine if the continuity axiom can be replaced with weak continuity in our main representation theorem. However, there is at least one noteworthy case in which these two continuity requirements are in fact equivalent, namely, the case of finite ARTICLE IN PRESS 4 For concreteness, we recall that this topology is metrizable, and a sequence ðp n Þ in PðX Þ converges to pAPðX Þ relative to this topology if and only if R X f dp n -R X f dp for all f ACðX Þ: 5 We should also make note of the following more common version of this axiom [10] : For all qAPðX Þ; the sets fp: phqg and fp: qhpg are closed in PðX Þ: We do not know if the main theorem of this paper can be proved with this weaker continuity condition, except in the case where X is a finite set. Conceptually speaking, however, we do not see much difference between these two continuity conditions. In fact, some textbooks (such as Mas-Colell et al. [16, p. 46] ) ''define'' the continuity axiom for an arbitrary preference relation on a topological space precisely as we do here. prize spaces. This is the content of the next proposition whose proof appears in Section 3 along with the proofs of our main results. Proposition 1. Let X be a nonempty finite set and h a preference relation on PðX Þ that satisfies the independence axiom. Then, h satisfies the continuity axiom if and only if it satisfies the weak continuity axiom.
As noted above, we do not know to what extent one may be able to relax the finiteness assumption in this proposition. Leaving this question unanswered, we now turn to analyze the expected utility theory that can be founded on the independence and continuity axioms.
Main results
While the significance of incomplete preference relations is noted in the literature, a definitive expected utility representation for such preorders does not seem to be agreed upon. Given the well-known characterization of the stochastic dominance orderings in terms of linear functionals that possess an expected utility form, we would like to propose here a multi-utility representation for such a preorder. Put more precisely, we seek here a set U of utility functions on X such that, for all p; qAPðX Þ; phq if and only if
This representation notion is certainly alluded to by [2, 11] , and studied in [4, 6] , albeit nonaxiomatically. It may be viewed as a dual of the theory of Knightian uncertainty. Loosely stated, in that theory, one compares horse race lotteries by means of taking expectations of a single utility function with respect to a set of probability measures [3] , whereas in our setting of objective uncertainty, the roulette lotteries are compared by taking expectations of a set of utility functions with respect to the given (objective) lotteries. 6 The main result of this paper states that any preference relation that satisfies the independence and continuity axioms admits an expected multi-utility representation, provided that the prize space X is compact. 7 Moreover, when X is finite, the
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6 One can, of course, aggregate the resulting set of expectations in various ways, may this set be arising from nonunique priors or multiple utility functions. Gilboa and Schmeidler [9] , for instance, develops a decision theory in which a single utility value is assigned to each horse race lottery by taking the minimum of this set, and dually, Maccheroni [12] shows that a particular relaxation of the independence axiom in the von Neumann-Morgenstern setup would yield a set of utilities the expectations of which are again aggregated by means of the min operator. The spirit of these two papers is, however, quite distinct from the present one as they deal with complete preference relations. 7 A similar result in an Anscombe-Aumann environment with a finite state space and countable sureoutcomes is given by Seidenfeld et al. [22] who obtain an expected state-dependent multi-utility representation. However, the continuity axiom used in [22] is far from standard. continuity axiom can be replaced in this statement with the weak continuity axiom (Proposition 1).
Expected multi-utility theorem. Let X be a compact metric space, and let h be a binary relation on PðX Þ: h is a preference relation that satisfies the independence and continuity axioms if and only if there exists a closed and convex set UDCðX Þ such that (1) holds for each p; qAPðX Þ:
We now turn to generalize the uniqueness part of the classic expected utility theorem in our multi-utility context. This generalization can in fact be carried out in an arbitrary (not necessarily compact) metric space X ; provided that the utility functions are chosen from C b ðX Þ; the set of all continuous and bounded real functions on X : The upshot is that if the sets U and V in C b ðX Þ represent a preference relation h as in (1), then V must belong to the closed convex cone generated by U and all constant functions; this is the content of the forthcoming uniqueness theorem. 8;9 Clearly, a special case of this observation is the standard uniqueness result of expected utility theory, for the closure of the convex cone generated by a singleton fug and all the constant functions is none other than the set fau þ b: ða; bÞAR þ Â Rg: To give another example, let us note that, for any subset U of C b ðX Þ and any ða; bÞAR þþ Â R; the sets U and aU þ b represent the same preference relation as in (1) . However, there are sets that are not of this form but that still represent the same preference relation. For example, let X :¼ ½0; 1 and U :¼ fu; vg where u; vACðX Þ are defined as uðxÞ :¼ x and vðxÞ :¼ x 2 : Then U and V :¼ fau þ ð1 À aÞv: 0oao1g represent the same preference relation on PðX Þ; but V cannot be written as aU þ b for any ða; bÞAR þ Â R:
To state formally our general uniqueness result on the set-valued expected utility representations, we define the operator / Á S : 2
where the closure operator is applied with respect to the weak topology on C b ðX Þ (or equivalently, with respect to the sup-norm topology when X is compact). 10 It is easy to verify that if U represents h; then so does /US: The following result tells us further that /US is in fact the largest set of utility functions in C b ðX Þ that represents
8 A number of versions and special cases of this result have actually been noted elsewhere in the literature; see, for instance, [4, 6, 19] . 9 In this paper by a convex cone (in any vector space) we mean a nonempty convex set that is closed under nonnegative scalar multiplication. For any set A; coneðAÞ stands for the smallest convex cone that contains A: 10 We recall that the weak topology on C b ðX Þ is the weakest topology on C b ðX Þ that declares continuous all functionals of the form f / R X f dm where m is any finite Borel signed measure on X :
h as in (1) . This observation can be viewed as a general uniqueness theorem for expected multi-utility representations.
Uniqueness theorem. Let X be a metric space. Two nonempty sets U and V in C b ðX Þ satisfy Z In the next section we will provide a few implications of these results, and discuss further some of the previous related work.
Supplementaries
Preferences over monetary lotteries
An interesting special case of the present setup is the case of monetary lotteries where X is a compact interval in the real line, say, X ¼ ½0; 1: Since in this case we wish to incorporate the idea that ''more money is preferred to less,'' one should examine the structure of the preference relations h on P½0; 1 such that p g FSD q implies pgq for all p; qAP½0; 1; where g FSD is the irreflexive part of the first-order stochastic dominance relation h FSD on P½0; 1: The issue is then to determine the structure of preferences that satisfy not only the axioms of independence and continuity, but also this monotonicity condition. To do this, let us agree to call a set U in R ½0;1 strictly increasing, if each uAU is weakly increasing, and if 0paobp1 implies uðaÞouðbÞ for some uAU: The following is a useful corollary of our main representation theorem. Proposition 2. Let h be a binary relation on P½0; 1: h is a preference relation that satisfies the independence, continuity and monotonicity axioms if, and only if, there exists a strictly increasing closed and convex set UDC½0; 1 such that (1) holds for each p; qAP½0; 1:
Given the general expected multi-utility theorem we have stated above, it is easy to check that any set U of utilities representing a monotonic preference relation h must be strictly increasing. Thus all we need to do here is to verify the monotonicity of a preference relation h for which there exists a strictly increasing U in C½0; 1 such that (1) 
Moreover (since U consists of increasing functions), R ½0;1 u dpX R ½0;1 u dq for all uAU: Hence we may conclude that pgq; which proves Proposition 2.
The extension of incomplete von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences
As noted in the Introduction, earlier studies on relaxing the completeness axiom within the paradigm of expected utility have focused on the problem of extending a preference relation that satisfies the independence and (various forms of) the continuity axioms in such a way that the extended relation admits a von NeumannMorgenstern representation. The important work of Aumann [2] , in particular, is geared towards finding a function u : X -R; referred to as an Aumann utility below, such that pgðBÞq implies Z X u dp4ð¼Þ
for all p; qAPðX Þ: A major disadvantage of this approach is that one cannot recover the preference relation h from its Aumann utility. So, in contrast to U in (1), the information contained in an Aumann utility for h is strictly less than h: Maximization of an expected Aumann utility on a given constraint set S leads to a h-maximal element in S; whereas the vector-maximization of all expected members of U leads to the set of all h-maximal elements in S:
It is, however, still worth knowing if an Aumann utility exists in the present context. Fortunately, mostly because we work with a continuity condition stronger than that adopted by Aumann, the answer is yes. 12 Proposition 3. Let X be a compact metric space, and let h be a preference relation on PðX Þ: If h satisfies the independence and continuity axioms, then it possesses a continuous Aumann utility. 11 The pseudoinverse distribution function of a probability measure pAP½0; 1 is defined by F À1 p ðsÞ :¼ minftA½0; 1: pð½0; tÞXsg for all sAð0; 1Þ: It is easily checked to be increasing and left continuous.
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Moreover, pseudoinverses display these two useful features: (i) R ½0;1 u dp ¼
12 This is perhaps somewhat surprising, because one major message of Aumann [2] is that an expected utility theory without the completeness axiom cannot be pursued along the extension approach, when X is infinite. However, since Aumann's related example does not work for a space of lotteries (it is proved in the mixture space R N ), there is reason to believe that the said message is in fact overly pessimistic. What is more, with a slight strengthening of Aumann's continuity axiom (as adopted here), both the extension and the multi-utility approaches stand strong, at least in the case of lotteries defined over an arbitrary compact metric space.
To prove this, we apply the expected multi-utility theorem to find a set U in CðX Þ such that (1) holds for all p; qAPðX Þ: Clearly, it is without loss of generality to assume that uX0 for all uAU: Since X is compact, CðX Þ is separable, and hence U is itself a separable metric space. Let fv 1 ; v 2 ; yg be a dense set in U: It is readily verified that 
Define w :¼ P N n¼1 u n ACðX Þ; and notice that, by the monotone convergence theorem, R X w dr ¼ P ð R X u n drÞ for all rAPðX Þ: Let p; qAPðX Þ: It is obvious that pBq implies R X w dp ¼ R X w dq: On the other hand, by (2), pgq implies that there exists a positive integer N such that R X u N dp4 R X u N dq while R X u n dpX R X u n dq for all n; whence Z X w dp
Thus, w is a continuous Aumann utility for h; and Proposition 3 is proved.
The algebraic approach to multi-utility representation
As noted in Section 1, Shapley and Baucells [24] advance a representation notion which actually admits the corresponding notion we introduced here as a special case. These authors identify conditions for a preference relation h on PðX Þ (actually on an arbitrary mixture space) to have a representation of the form phq if and only if TðpÞXTðqÞ for all TAO;
where O is a nonempty set of affine functionals on PðX Þ: The approach of Shapley and Baucells contrasts with the present one in that it is algebraic as opposed to topological. In the finite case the equivalence between the continuity and the weak continuity axioms (Proposition 1) makes it possible to derive our result from theirs. On the other hand, in the case of infinite X ; it is not clear if and when the functionals T in O do possess an expected-utility form. The problem is that it is not clear when each T can be chosen to be continuous on PðX Þ relative to the topology of weak convergence. While this may sound like a technical concern at first, it should be noted that, without this issue being resolved, the Shapley-Baucells approach does not yield an expected utility theorem. 13 Moreover, focusing only on simple lotteries does not solve the problem (see Remark 1 below for more on this).
Another difficulty with the Shapley-Baucells approach is that it does not function only in terms of the classical assumptions of independence and continuity, but it is, in addition, based on a crucial ''properness'' assumption which ensures that the cone flðp À qÞ: l40 and phqg has a nonempty algebraic interior by definition. Unfortunately, it is not at all easy to see what sort of a primitive axiom on a preference relation would support such a technical requirement.
Proofs
We begin with establishing a few basic facts that will prove useful in what follows.
14 Lemma 1. Let X be a metric space and h a preference relation on PðX Þ that satisfies the independence and weak continuity axioms. Then, for any p; qAPðX Þ; and any lAð0; 1;
Proof. Let p; qAPðX Þ and lAð0; 1 be such that lp þ ð1 À lÞrhlq þ ð1 À lÞr: Let % a :¼ supfaA½0; 1: ap þ ð1 À aÞrhaq þ ð1 À aÞrg:
Clearly % aXl40: Using the weak continuity of h it is easily verified that % ap þ ð1 À % aÞrh% aq þ ð1 À % aÞr: Now set b :¼ 1 1þ% a and observe that the independence axiom yields bð% ap þ ð1 À % aÞrÞ þ ð1 À bÞph bð% aq þ ð1 À % aÞrÞ þ ð1 À bÞp
But by definition of % a;
2% a 1þ% a p% a; that is, % a 2 À % aX0: Since % a40; therefore, we have % a ¼ 1; and hence the previous observation gives phq: & Lemma 2. Let X be a metric space and h a preference relation on PðX Þ that satisfies the independence and weak continuity axioms. Then, for any p; qAPðX Þ; phq holds if and only if there exist a l40 and r; sAPðX Þ with rhs and p À q ¼ lðr À sÞ: Moreover, the set CðhÞ :¼ flðp À qÞ: l40 and phqg is a convex cone in the linear space generated by PðX Þ; and we have phq if and only if p À qACðhÞ for any p; qAPðX Þ:
15
Proof. Take any l40 and r; sAPðX Þ such that rhs and p À q ¼ lðr À sÞ: Observe that the independence axiom gives
Applying Lemma 1, phq obtains. The converse claim follows upon setting l ¼ 1: Moreover, while that CðhÞ is a cone is trivial, its convexity follows from the independence axiom; we omit the routine details. The final claim is, on the other hand, an immediate consequence of the first part of this lemma. &
Proposition 1 is proved next.
Proof of Proposition 1. Define CðhÞ as in Lemma 2. To show that h satisfies the continuity axiom, it is enough to show that CðhÞ is a closed subset of spanðPðX ÞÞ (which equals R jX j here). Let s ¼ ð 1 jX j ; 1 jX j ; y; 1 jX j ÞAPðX Þ; and note that S :¼ frAPðX Þ: rhsg ¼ ðs þ CðhÞÞ-PðX Þ: Thus, if we can show that S is closed in PðX Þ; then it will follow that CðhÞ-ðPðX Þ À sÞ is closed in PðX Þ À s; and hence that CðhÞ is closed in the linear space generated by PðX Þ À s; whence in R jX j : Let affðSÞ denote the affine hull of S (i.e. the smallest linear manifold that contains S). Now if S is a singleton there is nothing to prove, so we assume that jSjX2: But the independence axiom implies that S is convex, so given that affðSÞ is finite-dimensional, the relative interior of S (i.e. its interior in affðSÞ) is nonempty; pick any p in this set. Now let q be any element of the boundary of S in affðSÞ; and B the open unit ball in the linear space affðSÞ À q: We claim that, for each lAð0; 1Þ and e40;
ARTICLE IN PRESS 15 We note that the significance of the set CðhÞ for expected utility theory without the completeness axiom was observed first by Aumann [2] . Like that of Aumann, the primary element of the approach we adopt here is the investigation of the geometry of CðhÞ: This approach is also adopted by a number of authors in the literature, among which are [3, 8, 11, 24, 25] .
To see this, for any bAB; pick a d40 small enough that eb þ dBDeB: Since q belongs to the boundary of S (in affðSÞ), there must exist a oAS with oAq þ dB: But then ð1 À lÞðq À wÞ þ ebAdB þ ebDeB so that
Now, since p is in the relative interior of S; for any lAð0; 1Þ there exists an e40 small enough that p þ e l BDS so that, by (4), we get
Since 0AB; this proves that lp þ ð1 À lÞqAS for all lAð0; 1Þ; so it follows from the weak continuity axiom that qAS: Thus we may conclude that S contains its boundary in affðSÞ; so it is closed in affðSÞ: But since affðSÞ is finite-dimensional, the closures of S in affðSÞ and PðX Þ are identical, so it follows that S is closed in PðX Þ: & To prove the expected multi-utility theorem, we need to introduce some terminology. In what follows, for any metric space X ; we let caðX Þ stand for the set of all finite Borel signed measures on X : Clearly, caðX Þ is the linear space generated by PðX Þ; that is, caðX Þ :¼ spanðPðX ÞÞ:
It is well known that when X is compact, caðX Þ (normed by the total variation norm) is isometrically isomorphic to the topological dual of CðX Þ (normed by the supnorm). Using this duality, we shall consider caðX Þ in this paper as endowed with the weak Ã -topology. 16 It is important to note that this weak Ã -topology on caðX Þ induces on the set of lotteries PðX Þ the standard topology of weak convergence for probability measures.
Proof of the expected multi-utility theorem. The necessity of the axioms for the representation is easy to verify; we shall rather focus here on their sufficiency. Let h satisfy the independence and continuity axioms, define CðhÞ as in Lemma 2, and recall that CðhÞ is a convex cone in caðX Þ such that phq if and only if p À qACðhÞ: The following claim provides the key step of the proof.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
16 Under this topology, a net ðm a Þ in caðX Þ converges to mAcaðX Þ if and only if R X f dm a -R X f dm for all f ACðX Þ: Claim 1. CðhÞ is weak Ã -closed.
Proof of Claim 1. We shall first show that CðhÞ is sequentially weak Ã -closed. Take then a sequence ðl n ðp n À q n ÞÞ in CðhÞ; and assume that ðl n ðp n À q n ÞÞ converges in caðX Þ in the weak Ã -topology. If p n ¼ q n for infinitely many n; then l n ðp n À q n Þ-0ACðhÞ; hence it is without loss of generality to assume that p n aq n for each n: Now note that, by definition, R X fdðl n ðp n À q n ÞÞ must be a convergent real sequence for all f ACðX Þ; and this implies that sup Z X fdðl n ðp n À q n ÞÞ: n ¼ 1; 2; y oN:
By the Banach-Steinhaus theorem, therefore, there exists a real number K such that
Now, by using the Jordan decomposition theorem, we can write p n À q n ¼ g n ðr n À w n Þ for two mutually singular r n ; w n APðX Þ such that r n hw n and g n 40: By mutual singularity, jjr n À w n jj ¼ 2: But then jjl n ðp n À q n Þjj ¼ jjl n g n ðr n À w n Þjj ¼ l n g n jjðr n À w n Þjj ¼ 2l n g n so that, by (5), we may conclude that ðl n g n Þ is a real sequence that lies in the closed interval ½0; K=2: This sequence must then have a convergent subsequence ðl n k g n k Þ: But since X is compact, PðX Þ is a weak Ã -compact set in caðX Þ; and hence both ðr n k Þ and ðw n k Þ must have (weak Ã -)convergent subsequences. 17 Passing to these subsequences consecutively, we end up with convergent subsequences ðl n k t g n k t Þ; ðr n k t Þ; and ðw n k t Þ: Let us write l n k t g n k t -l; r n k t -p and w n k t -q as t-N: By continuity of h; we have phq: Moreover, l n k t ðp n k t À q n k t Þ ¼ ðl n k t g n k t Þðr n k t À w n k t Þ-lðp À qÞ as t-N: Since every subsequence of a convergent sequence converges to the limit of the mother sequence, we must then have lim l n ðp n À q n Þ ¼ lðp À qÞACðhÞ; and hence we may conclude that CðhÞ is sequentially weak Ã -closed. Since X is compact, CðX Þ is separable, and caðX Þ is equal (i.e. isometrically isomorphic) to the topological dual of This means that vAU and R X v dp We conclude with two technical remarks that intend to clarify the distinction between the arguments needed to prove the expected multi-utility theorem in the cases where X is finite and infinite. Remark 1. Much of the analysis above is based on the fact that applying the supporting hyperplane theorem to the convex cone CðhÞ yields readily a set of weak Ã -continuous linear functionals T on caðX Þ that allows us represent h as in (3) . But the use of the supporting hyperplane theorem is warranted only if CðhÞ is weak Ã -closed in caðX Þ: This is not a serious problem when X is finite, for then caðX Þ is none other then R jX j ; and we can verify relatively easily that the (weak) continuity of h is enough to guarantee that CðhÞ is closed; this is the gist of the proof of Proposition 1. Claim 1 above shows that if we strengthen weak continuity to the continuity axiom, we can again guarantee that CðhÞ is closed in caðX Þ when X is an infinite (yet compact) set. This requires harder work, because caðX Þ is a locally convex topological linear space which is not metrizable when jX j ¼ N: A natural question is if one can do away with these complications by focusing instead of PðX Þ on the set P s ðX Þ of all simple lotteries on X ; and using the independence and continuity axioms only for lotteries that belong to P s ðX Þ: Contrary to what one may at first expect, the answer is no (even when X is compact), for we do not know if (and how) one can show that CðhÞ is weak Ã -closed in the linear space Y generated by P s ðX Þ: In particular, the method adopted in Proposition 1 fails here because Y is infinite-dimensional, and the idea behind Claim 1 does not apply because Y is not a Banach space.
Remark 2. While our main representation theorem is strong enough to cover many cases of interest, it does not function in the general domain that the classical (topological version) of the expected utility theorem (that yields continuous utility functions over the prize space) functions, namely, for preferences defined over lotteries on an arbitrary separable metric space. Whether our result can be extended to this general domain is presently an open problem. It may be worth noting that the main difficulty in this regard is that, when X is not compact, the ''natural'' topologies on C b ðX Þ and caðX Þ (induced by the dual pair structure ðC b ðX Þ; caðX ÞÞ under the duality map ð f ; mÞ/ R X f dm) differs from the standard weak and weak Ã -topologies (induced by the sup-norm). This, in turn, invalidates the arguments given in the key step (Claim 1) of the proof of our main theorem; in particular, the KreinSˇmulian theorem does not apply in this context.
